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REASONABLE EPA PROJECTION TECHNIQUES FOR
ESTIMATING TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES UPHELD
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-AUTO EMISSIONS STANDARDS: The
EPA, in promulgating diesel auto emission standards, may make
projections of future technological advances and the time required
to attain them. These projections must be reasonable, considering
theoretical objections to the technology and remaining practical prob-
lems to be solved, before the technology is implemented. National
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, 655 F.2d 318 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
For more than twenty years our nation's lawmakers have been aware
of the environmental problems caused by airborne pollutants.' A major
portion of the atmospheric pollutants in many larger cities derives from
automobile exhaust.' Carbon monoxide, unburned hydrocarbons, oxides
of nitrogen, and particulates constitute the greatest recognized hazards to
the population and the environment resulting from the operation of internal
3combustion engines.
The Clean Air Act (Act)4 demonstrates the magnitude of congressional
concern with the problems associated with atmospheric pollution. The
Act authorizes the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate,
among other things, the emission of harmful pollutants from motor ve-
hicles. The regulatory scheme contained within the Act contemplates two
types of standards with respect to automobile emissions. Absolute stan-
dards, such as those specified for carbon monoxide, hydrocarbons, and
oxides of nitrogen, are set by the Act itself and may be subject to waiver
provisions, In addition to these fixed standards, the Act empowers the
EPA Administrator to promulgate standards applicable to other pollutants
which in his judgment either cause or contribute to air pollution or may
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare. 6 These
standards must be prospective in nature and allow for such lead time as
the Administrator determines is necessary to permit the development and
application of the required technology.7 The standards are technology-
forcing because they require that a certain level of technology be estab-
lished by the end of a set grace period. It is quite clear from the legislative
history of the Act that Congress intended these standards to be technology-
forcing and that it expected EPA to make projections of future advances
I. I A. REITZE, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW three-27 (1972).
2. J. BRECHER & M. NESTLE, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK 182 (1970).
3. F. GRAD, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 3-2-3 (1978).
4. 42 U.S.C. §7401-7642 (Supp. 11 1978).
5. Id. at §7521(b)(1).
6. Id. at §7521(a)(1).
7. Id.
NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
in pollution control technology to form the basis for setting such stan-
dards.'
Historically, tension has existed between technology-forcing statutes,
such as the Clean Air Act, and technological feasibility. It usually appears
in the form of a dispute between the regulatory agency and the regulated
industry over whether the technology required to implement the standard
exists or can be developed within the required time. 9
This tension, coupled with concqrn over fuel efficiency and exhaust
pollutants, has led to evaluations of different engine types in a search for
alternatives to the gasoline engine for use in light duty vehicles.'" The
diesel engine has been proposed as an attractive alternative because of
its greater fuel efficiency and lower emission of certain regulated pollu-
tants." However, diesel vehicles emit from 30 to 70 times the particulates
emitted by gasoline engines of comparable size.12 Studies of the size
distribution of these particulates and the nature of the organic compounds
contained on their surfaces have shown that their inhalation will result
in significant lung deposits with possible carcinogenic or mutagenic po-
tential. 13
Concern over these potential hazards led the EPA to promulgate stan-
dards which became effective April 4, 1980, for particulate emissions
from light duty diesels.' 4 These regulations limited diesel particulates to
0.60 grams per vehicle mile (gpm) for model year 1982 and to 0.20 gpm
in model year 1985.'1
On May 5, 1980, General Motors Corporation (GM) submitted a pe-
tition requesting that the EPA reconsider these standards. The Adminis-
trator denied this request on June 27, 1980 and GM appealed. 16 In Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (NRDC v. EPA), '" GM's challenges to these standards, along
8. S. REP. NO. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1970), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
424; H.R. REP. NO. 294, 95th. Cong., 1st Sess. 273, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 1077, 1352, 4 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 2740.
9. Typical industry complaints are that the projections of future technological advances by the
regulatory agency are unsound, unscientific, over-optimistic, based solely on theoretical instead of
practical considerations, not feasible from a cost or engineering standpoint, or some combination
of the above.
10. Light duty vehicles include any passenger car or passenger car derivative capable of seating
12 passengers or less. 40 C.F.R. § 86.077-2 (1980).
11. 45 Fed. Reg. 5480, 5493 n. 192 (1980).
12. 45 Fed. Reg. 14,496 (1980).
13. R. Cuddihy, W. Griffith, C. Clark & R. McClellan, Potential Health and Environmental
Effects of Light Duty Diesel Vehicles 11 (Oct. 1981) (unpublished manuscript).
14. See note 12 supra.
15. The standard for light duty diesel trucks was set at 0.26 gpm for 1985.
16. Any appeal from a final action taken by the Administrator after the promulgation of an
automobile emission standard must be filed in the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia. 42 U.S.C. §7607(b) (Supp. I 1978).
17. 655 F.2d 318 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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with challenges by other automobile manufacturers and by the Natural
Resources Defense Council (NRDC)' 8 were consolidated before the Dis-
trict of Columbia Court of Appeals.
The auto industry maintained that the 1985 standard of 0.20 gpm was
too strict and that EPA's prediction that the trap oxidizer, an experimental
particulate removal device, would be perfected in time for installation on
1985 models was unfounded. They argued that this prediction was unduly
optimistic and failed to take into account engineering realities. NRDC,
on the other hand, argued that the standards were not strict enough. They
disagreed with EPA's decision to set a single standard for all light duty
vehicles based on the poorest performing engine, urging instead that a
variable standard be implemented which would impose more demanding
requirements on the better performing vehicles. They also urged less delay
in implementing all standards. The court upheld EPA's regulations. It
concluded that EPA could use reasonable projection techniques to estimate
technological advances and that regulations based on these techniques
should be upheld unless clearly arbitrary and capricious. 19
In its analysis, the court first considered the appropriate standard of
review. Courts traditionally will set aside agency actions only if the actions
are found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law.2" This policy was codified in the Clean Air
Act.2 In Portland Cement Ass'n. v. Ruckleshaus the court elaborated:
[t]he necessity to review agency decisions, if it is to be more than
a meaningless exercise, requires enough steeping in technical matters
to determine whether the agency has exercised a reasoned discretion.
... We cannot substitute our own judgment for that of the agency,
but it is our duty to consider whether the decision was based on a
consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a
clear error-of judgment.22
This position was re-emphasized in Essex Chemical Corporation v.
Ruckleshaus where the court stated: "[o]ur expertise is not in setting
standards for emission control but in determining if the standards as set
are the result of reasoned decision-making. "23 This led the court in NRDC
v. EPA to try to determine what constitutes reasoned decision making and
by what guidelines it can be measured.
International Harvester v. Ruckleshaus24 provided an operational def-
18. The Natural Resources Defense Council is a lobby group devoted to the preservation of our
natural environment.
19. 655 F.2d at 344.
20. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9)(A) (Supp. 1 1977).
22. 486 F.2d 375, 402 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974).
23. 486 F.2d 427, 434 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 969 (1974).
24. 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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inition of reasoned decision making. The court therein upheld the EPA's
power to make projections of future technological advancements but em-
phasized that "the Administrator's latitude for projection is subject to the
restraints of reasonableness, and does not open the door to crystal-ball
inquiry." 25 The court held that the EPA must show a reasonable basis for
believing its projections to be reliable, including "a showing of the reli-
ability of the methodology of prediction." 26
While International Harvester provides some guidelines as to the court's
interpretation of what reasoned decision making is, it is important to note
that EPA was not, on that occasion, predicting future technological ad-
vances, but instead was making its own interpretation of current data
produced by the auto industry. In a situation such as this, where facts
relating to the feasibility of a technology or standard are readily available
and the only real controversy is over the interpretation of those facts,
courts continue to be very demanding in their inquiry into agency meth-
odology.27
On the other hand, where the predictions made by a regulatory agency
involve questions at the frontier of scientific knowledge, the agency has
been held to have broad discretion to make its projections to the best of
its ability by using whatever information is available. 8 As stated in Ethyl
Corporation v. EPA, "[t]he Administrator may apply his expertise to
draw conclusions from suspected, but not completely substantiated, re-
lationships between facts, from trends among facts, from theoretical pro-
jections, from imperfect data, from probative preliminary data not yet
certifiable as fact, and the like." 3"
The prediction of the technological feasibility of the trap oxidizer at
issue in NRDC v. EPA3 falls somewhere between these two extremes. A
prototype trap oxidizer has been developed and it works. Thus, the tech-
nology required for the particulate standards is not only theoretically
possible, but also falls within the realm of engineering reality. However,
it is not without engineering problems which must be solved before the
device can be included on light duty diesel vehicles. These problems
include the development of a durable filter material, selection of a work-
able incineration method, and improvement of efficiency. The court con-
cluded that EPA had adequately defended the reasonableness of its basis
for prediction of the technological feasibility of the trap oxidizer by (1)
25. Id. at 629.
26. Id. at 642.
27. National Lime Association v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
28. Industrial Union Department v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
29. 541 F.2d I (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976).
30. Id. at 28.
31. 655 F.2d 318 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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answering the theoretical objections to the trap oxidizer, (2) identifying
the major steps necessary to ready the device for mass production, and
(3) presenting plausible reasons for believing that each of those steps in
(2) can be completed within the time allowed by the regulation.32
On the surface, the court's three-step standard for determining whether
EPA's projections are the result of reasoned decision making seems to
be a workable one. If a technology is shown to be theoretically achievable
and the remaining steps necessary to refine it can be identified, it is at
least possible that, in time, the remaining problems can be worked out
and the technology put to practical use. The critical question is what
criteria the agency should use to evaluate whether each of the remaining
steps necessary for refinement of the technology can be completed within
the time available. The EPA has convinced the court that these criteria
should be: (1) initial partial success of the project, (2) the rapidity of
recent progress, and (3) industry predictions of future progress. 33
While these criteria may be useful as indicators of future progress in
a new technology, they should not be treated as dispositive. The criteria
assume a linear relationship between progress made in a new technology
and time elapsed since its inception. This assumption is faulty because
the usual pattern of development is an initial flurry of success followed
by a much slower rate of advancement, during which time the more
difficult engineering problems are worked out. Thus, the reviewing court
should ensure that the agency has focused on the character of the unsolved
problems themselves, rather than on the rapidity of progress to date, in
determining whether the agency's projections of progress are plausible.
Judge Robb, in his dissent, stated that he agreed with the majority's
three-step standard for judging the reasonableness of the EPA's basis for
prediction. He felt, however, that, in this case, the EPA had not offered
plausible reasons for believing that each of the major refinement steps
can be completed within the time available. 4 In making this argument,
the dissent misses the critical point. Under the majority's criteria for
evaluation of plausibility, the EPA met this requirement. EPA referred to
industry test results which demonstrate some limited initial success with
a prototype trap oxidizer. 35 EPA pointed out the definite rapid initial
progress over the last 1 /2years in the areas of efficiency and incineration
techniques.36 Further, EPA referred to manufacturer's speculations that
the trap oxidizer could possibly be introduced in 1985 production auto-
mobiles. The "wrong result," which the dissent feels was reached in this
32. Id. at 332-36.
33. Id. at 334-35.
34. Id. at 345.
35. 45 Fed. Reg. 14,496, 14,498 (1980).
36. Id.
January 1983]
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case, arises not because the EPA did not meet its criteria for determining
plausibility, but rather because the criteria themselves were faulty. The
agency's characterization of the remaining improvements necessary as
"engineering problems, and ...more a function of the resources allo-
cated to the problem than any scientific or technical breakthrough' '3 is
a gross oversimplification. It does not reflect a hard look at the character
and nature of the engineering difficulties themselves.
NRDC v. EPA represents a continuation of the policy of the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals to uphold the technology-forcing nature of
the Clean Air Act. The majority has attempted to clarify the somewhat
vague references to "reasonable projections of technological advances"
referred to in earlier opinions, and has made commendable progress in
this area. The court upheld a regulatory agency's power to make reason-
able projections of the time needed for technological advances in the
setting of standards. Such projections will be reasonable if the agency:
(1) answers any theoretical objections to the technology, (2) identifies the
major steps necessary for practical applications, and (3) offers plausible
reasons for believing that each of the major steps in (2) can be completed
in the time available. Finally, they have adopted the agency's criteria for
determining the plausibility required in (3), which consider initial partial
successes in the development of the technology, the rapidity of recent
progress, and industry speculation regarding future progress. Adoption
of these agency criteria represents the only major flaw in the court's
decision. The court should replace these criteria with criteria that focus
on the character of the engineering and developmental problems them-
selves in order to project how long their solution will take, rather than
rely on past progress. It is up to the courts to provide guidance in this
area. It is only with the aid of such guidance that both industry and
environmental agencies will know what is expected of them and will be
better able to effect long range planning.
JOHN A. STANLEY
37. 655 F.2d at 333.
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